_Follow along with this video:_ --- ### Front Running in Puppy Raffle Let's look at how Puppy Raffle was vulnerable to front running. Our Puppy Raffle's core function is `selectWinner`. <details> <summary>PuppyRaffle.sol::selectWinner</summary> ```js function selectWinner() external { require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over"); require(players.length >= 4, "PuppyRaffle: Need at least 4 players"); uint256 winnerIndex = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, block.timestamp, block.difficulty))) % players.length; address winner = players[winnerIndex]; uint256 totalAmountCollected = players.length * entranceFee; uint256 prizePool = (totalAmountCollected * 80) / 100; uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100; totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); uint256 tokenId = totalSupply(); // We use a different RNG calculate from the winnerIndex to determine rarity uint256 rarity = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, block.difficulty))) % 100; if (rarity <= COMMON_RARITY) { tokenIdToRarity[tokenId] = COMMON_RARITY; } else if (rarity <= COMMON_RARITY + RARE_RARITY) { tokenIdToRarity[tokenId] = RARE_RARITY; } else { tokenIdToRarity[tokenId] = LEGENDARY_RARITY; } delete players; raffleStartTime = block.timestamp; previousWinner = winner; (bool success,) = winner.call{value: prizePool}(""); require(success, "PuppyRaffle: Failed to send prize pool to winner"); _safeMint(winner, tokenId); } ``` </details> Effectively, when the `selectWinner` function is called, the transaction is then sent to the MemPool. At this point anyone can see the results of the selectWinner function. If a user participating in the raffle identifies that they didn't win, the potential exists for them to refund their entry fee! A user does this by recognizing that they lost, and then paying more gas to have their refund request processed before the `selectWinner` transaction. This will lower the prize of the winner!  ### Wrap Up What a sore loser. Let's see how TSwap is affected next!